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AUTONOI\1Y9S MAGIC WAND: ABORTION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
ANiTA L. ALLEN* 
Constitutional law changes, even though the Constitution remains the 
same. American abortion Jaw aptly illustrates this point .  Although the text 
of the Fourteenth Amendment has remained constant since the United 
States Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade 1 in  1973, the Court has altered 
its position on the constitutionality of restrictive abortion statutes. Accord­
ing to Roe, the Due Process Clause prohibits government from criminalizing 
early abortions. Yet, recent decisions permit government to restrict abort ion 
throughout pregnancy in the interest of maternal well-being and u nborn l ife. 
Moreover, four Jus tices favor overruling Roe out right . 2  
This essay comments o n  the changeability o f  constitutional l a w  and its 
interpretation by the Supreme Court, emphasizing the deterioration of the 
Supreme Court doct rine that the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses a 
fundamental right of privacy broad enough to include abortion. Another 
closely related doctrinal shift is the Court's virtual "about face" on the con­
stitutionality of abortion restrict ions. 
The "about face" began in 1989 with Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv­
ices, 3 a decision upholding restrictive provisions of Missouri's abortion law, 4 
and continued in 1992 with Planned Parenthood v. Casey.5 Casey tested the 
constitutionality of provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Con trol Act 
that permitted abortion but subjected patients and their health care provid­
ers to controversial consent, notification, and public reporting requirements.6 
Specifically,  the law required (1) that minors obtain parental consent or a 
court order; (2) that married women not meeting one of several exceptions 
notify their husbands; (3) that all women give ;'informed consent" after 
receiving information discouraging abortion and waiting twenty-four hours; 
and (4) that abortion facilities submit and disclose detailed public reports7 
* Professor of Law. Georgewwn l.iniversity Law Center. Ph.D. !979. university of 
Michigan: J.D. 1984, Harvard Law S..:hool. 
1 4 10 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2 They are Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White. Scalia, and Thomas. 
3 492 liS 490 (!989). 
1 Si!e Anita L. Allen. Webster ,\larks Time. 2 BJOL\W 1531. 15�3 (1969) (discu�sing 
VVcb>·tqr). 
5 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) 
6 18 P \ Cor.-s. ST-'..T. �§ 3203-3220 ( 1990) 
7 hi. Critics fe:11· that this last requirement will comprom1sc patient anonymity <Jnd 
drown abcJrtion providers in rctpenvork. 
68.3 
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In Thornburgh v. A merican College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 8 an 
earlier test of Pennsylvania law, the Court invalidated informed consent and 
record-keeping statutes similar to those revisited in Casey. Thornburgh was 
a resounding endorsement of Roe. Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun 
condemned as unconstitutional state efforts to legislate time-consuming, 
expensive, and invasive preconditions to abortion services. 9  U nder Thorn­
burgh, a state may neither ban nor restrict abortion by encumbering the 
decision to abort . 
In Thornburgh, as in R oe, a majority of the Court portrayed the right of 
abortion privacy as "fundamental." In effect, Roe and Thornburgh declared 
legislative interference with free choice prima facie invalid. Most observers 
correctly predicted that a reconstituted panel of nine Justices would decide 
Casey differently from the Court's Thornburgh decision just six years earlier. 
After Thornburgh, the number of Justices subscribin g  to the jurisprudence 
of fundamental abortion rights dwindled. Subjecting strikingly similar laws 
to strikingly dissimilar analysis, the Casey majority affirmed the "essential" 
holding of Roe, 10 but abandoned the presumption that most restrictions on 
abortion are unconstitutional. Casey portrayed legislated i mpediments that 
do not "unduly burden" the fundamental abortion right as prima facie valid, 
even if they make abortion inconvenient and expensiveY The Court stated 
that an anti-abortion statute imposes an "undue" burden if it places a sub­
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable 
fetusY 
Reaffirming Roe in Casey, but abandoning its strict standard of constitu­
tional validity, the Court labored to avoid the appearance of constitutional 
change. It elaborated its "obligation to follow precedent"13 and the impro­
priety of "reexamining the prior law with[out] any justification beyond a 
present doctrinal disposition to come out differently from the Court of 
1973."14 The majority opinion stressed R oe's promise of female liberty. The 
Court's feminist rhetorical flourishes linked a woman's "unique" reproduc­
tive liberty to her ability "to participate equally in the economic and social 
8 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
9 !d . at 772. 
1° Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804. The Casey Court referred to the "essential" holding of 
Roe as the recognition of: 
!d. 
the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it 
without undue interference from the State . . (,] the State's power to restrict abor­
tions after fetal viability, ... [and] the principle that the State has legitimate interests 
from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life 
of the fetus that may become a child. 
11 !d. at 2819. 
12 Id. at 2820. 
13 Jd. at 2808-16. 
14 Id. at 2813-14. 
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life of the Nation"15 in roles she chooses. Declaring the importance of inti­
macy and personal life, the Court repudiated categorical abortion bans and 
rejected Pennsylvania's regulation requiring spousal notification as unduly 
burdensome.16 
In reality, however, the Court's  version of stare decisis openly announced 
a new, weaker standard of review for all abortion cases and employed that 
standard to uphold statutes virtually identical to those it declared unconsti­
tutional just a few years ago. The Court upheld the stringent informed con­
sent/twenty-four hour waiting period. Moreover, Casey jettisoned the 
defining "trimester" analytic framework of R oe, which prohibited states 
from regulating abortion for maternal and fetal well-being until the second 
and third trimesters of pregnancy, respectively.  As originally interpreted, 
Roe may be cited as grounds for severely limiting until the third trimester 
state intervention premised on the interest of the unborn. Although Casey 
prohibited pre-viability blanket bans on abortion, the majority maintained 
that states have an assertible interest in  the fetus at all stages of pregnancyY 
As a result, Casey departed significantly enough from Roe to lessen its 
vaunted "1egitimacy. "18 Casey can be seen as just the kind of unprincipled 
politic(llly  opportune decision making made "unnecessarily and under pres­
sure"19 that the majority claimed it wanted to avoid. 
Stressing that the Roe framework had not proven unworkable, the Court 
nevertheless significantly modified the constitutional law set forth in R oe .  
Justices Blackmun and Stevens voted i n  partial dissents i n  Casey to preserve 
the classic version of Roe. Although the conservative block, consisting of 
Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas, decided it was time to 
rewrite constitutional abortion law, the moderate block, consisting of Jus­
tices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, thought it  was time to reread it .  
Hmv did the Court get from Roe and Thornburgh to Casey? How does 
constitutional law change even though the Constitution remains the same? 
In one sense the move from Roe and Thornburgh to Casey is easy to com­
prehend. With departures from and new appointments to the Court, the 
number of Justices willing to defend the right to choose abortion on funda­
m ental privacy grounds shrank.  The Court, viewed as a collective entity. 
simply changed its mind. 
The Court, however, should not change its mind so freely.  Although it 
can be explained as a political shift to the right in the Court's composition, 
the transition from Thornburgh to Casey may nevertheless appear inexplica­
ble to members of the general public predisposed to view the discipline of 
constitutional interpretation as exact, binding, and, once the judge dons the 
black robes, apol itical . If constitutional interpretation were an exact, bind-
1� !d. at 2809. 
16 Id at 2826-31. 
17 !d. at 2816. 
13 Id 
19 Id at 2815. 
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mg, and apolit ical discipline, the mere change in learned personnel would 
not change the meaning of fundamental Jaw . We would not go from a 
Thornburgh to a Webster in only three years, or from a Roe to a Casey in a 
mere twenty. 
The disempowered status of the fundamental right to privacy demon­
strates that even rights formulated in the sweeping language of fundamental­
ity and sanctity, rights that promise to function as magic wands for 
autonomous individuals, are vul nerable to repudiation if new Justices con­
clude that earlier ones committed egregious error. In varying degrees, the 
Justices who have joined the Court since Roe-Scalia, Thomas, Souter, Ken­
nedy, and O'Connor-like Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, 
believe that Roe contains improper reasoning and that its mistakes may not 
stand. There is,  however, notorious disagreement about the extent to which 
Roe was erroneous. What I characterize below as "backward-looking'' and 
"downward-looking" approaches to constitutional interpretation20 contrib­
uted to the Court's rapid reassessment of Roe. 
Accounting for change in the jurisprudence of abortion rights is an occa­
sion for reflecting on the implicit legal and interpretive philosophies of the 
federal judiciary in constitutional opinions. In the abortion field, consti tu­
tional law has changed because the composition of the Court has changed­
Republican presidents have appointed m ore moderates and conservatives 
and fewer liberals .  I suggest that, although conservative, liberal, and moder­
ate Justices alike employ backward-looking, positivistic rhetoric to justify 
their decisions, the contingent of Justices with aggressively-and, arguably, 
heedlessly-backward-looking substantive approaches to constitutional 
interpretation has grown. Aggressively backward-looking substantive 
approaches have undercut the jurisprudence of fundamental privacy that 
once supported strict judicial protection of abortion rights. As a result, 
\\'Omen seeking abortions face numerous new restrictions and the threat of 
ultimate prohibition.  
LIBERATING AUTONOMY 
Nearly thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided Gris­
wold v. ConnecticutY The Griswold Court held that states may not 
criminalize a married woman's use of birth control. as Connecticut and 
many other states had done since the Comstock Era of the late nineteenth 
century."2 The Griswold Court based i ts  holding on a generaL fundamental 
constitutional right to privacy, announcing for the first t ime the existence of 
a discrete, general constitutional right of privacy. Previously. the Court had 
:tppeaied to the concept of privacy occasionaily to justify or ;·eject L:gislative 
:J.•l Sc-u inji-a text accompanying notes 57-71. 
21 38i U.S .  479 (196:5). 
22 DEHOR.·\H L. RHODE, JUSTICE .-\!\:D GENDER 204, 264 (1989) (Irctl'lr1�. the: nohing 
rdanonship between gender and the law in the United States). 
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or Jaw enforcement policy.23 Furthermore, early in the century, state courts 
had begun recognizing privacy rights expressly in tort law, inspired by 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis's famous 1890 Harvard Law Review 
articl e .24 Warren and Brandeis, however, l imited their argument to the state 
common law of torts .  Moreover, Justice Brandeis's eloquent appeal to the 
value of privacy in a dissenting opinion in  an early Supreme Court wiretap­
ping case25 fel l  short of recognizing an independent constitutional privacy 
right .  
Griswold characterized the right of  privacy as  "fundamental. "  A s  l ater 
cases would explain, "fundamental" rights "qualify for heightened judicial 
protection ."26 Fundamental rights are those the Court deems to be either 
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"27 or "implicit in the 
concept of ordered l iberty" so that "neither liberty nor j ustice would exist if 
they were sacrificed.  "28 In enacting legislation affecting a nonfundamental 
constitutional right or liberty, state and federal lawmakers may impinge 
upon that constitutional right or liberty if the legislation is "rationally 
related" to the furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest. By con­
trast, designated "fundamental" rights are so strong that government must 
establish a "compelling" state interest in legislation that impairs them. 
l·\ccordin gly, the fundamental right to privacy requires courts to invalidate 
legislation involving public interference with private decisionmaking, u nless 
strict judicial scrutiny uncovers a compelling state interest.29 
The Griswold case appeared to signal that the courts would strictly protect 
against laws impinging upon privacy . 30 At first, Justice Douglas's majority 
opinion explaining the jurisprudence of constitutional privacy caused some 
confusion31 Douglas raised the notion of a totalitarian specter of police 
2 3  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The 
makers of our Constitution . . conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let 
::done-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."). 
2.; Samuel D. \Varren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARY. L. REV. 
193 (1890). 
2'; 0/msiead. 277 U.S. at 471-85. 
2li Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S 186, 191 (1985) (arguing that consensual sodomy 
bet'."een homosexuals is not a fundamental right). 
27 iYloore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 ( 1977). 
::s Palko v. Conn.;cticut . 302 U.S. 3 1 9, 32 5 , 326 (1937) (finding a state statute allowing 
the :;tate to appeal criminal cases to be consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment). 
29 Recently. the Court has begun to inquire whether challenged legislation unduly bur­
dens a constitutional right. When it is deemed not to, strict scrutiny yields to a weaker 
standard of review and state action is upheld. See infra text accompanying notes 55-56 
(discussing parental nOtification cases). 
30 But they have not. See. e.g.. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 26 1 
( 1990) (upholdi!lg a state requirement that evidence of an "incompetent's wishes as to the 
\'.ithdrc;wal of life-sustaining treatment" be clear and convincing). 
:JJ Sec i\nita L. Allen. Taking Liberties: Privacy. Pri;·are Choice. and Social Col/lracr 
Theon·. 56 U. CI:--;. L Rt:v. 461.467-68 (1987). 
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entering the "sacred" realm of the marital bedroom, checking for evidence 
of i l legal birth control practices. Yet, he was less concerned about invasions 
into physical privacy-trespassing typical of Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure cases-than invasions into decisional privacy.32 Douglas presented a 
vision of American life in which men and women, consulting medical profes­
sionals of their own choosing, would have the legal power to decide for 
themselves certain important matters touching family life, especially 
whether and when to have children. 
In  the ancient Western world, the Greeks and Romans understood social 
life to i nclude separate public and private realms.33 Matters relating to the 
household, women, children, and servants or slaves were deemed-and deni­
grated as-private affairs. Although the value placed on the private sphere 
has changed, the cultural assumption of an appropriately private sphere 
remains.  Griswold reflects this value by holding that courts must interpret 
our Constitution to include broad protection of what is appropriately consid­
ered private life. 34 
The ultimate value of decisional privacy rights regarding procreation may 
be that such rights make us more fit for our social roles in  group life.35 Yet, 
the flourishing of communal life depends largely on the flourishin g  of indi­
viduals who are morally autonomous and free to act on their own judg­
ments. 36 Moral autonomy connotes the capacity for rational,  responsible 
self-regulation and self-determination . 37 A society's laws can either promote 
or impair moral autonomy so conceived. In  the nineteenth century, John 
Stuan Mill made the classic liberal defense of legal autonomy, arguing in 
favor of freedom from governmental interference in the broad domain of 
self-regarding conduct , which defense received support from the utilitarian 
belief that individuals know themselves and therefore their interests best.38 
32 ld. 
33 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-78 (1958) (discussing various 
pre-modern views of the public and private realms); see also JDRGEN HABERMAS, THE 
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY I NTO A C1\TE· 
GORY OF BouRGEOIS SociETY 3-5 (Thomas Burger trans .. The MIT Press 1989) ( 1962) 
(discussing the public and private spheres of the Greeks and Romans). 
3'" Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86. 
35 See ANITA L ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN .\ FREE SOC!· 
ETY 51-52 (1988) (analyzing privacy as it relates to women in America). 
36 Jd 
37 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPH'r'SICS OF 
MoR.A.LS AND WH:'\T ls ENLIGHTENMENT (Lewis W. Beck trans., Bobbs-Mcrrill Educa­
tional Publishing 1981) ( 1785) (arguing that human beings possess moral autonomy and 
that rational and free beings are properly ascribed moral status and moral responsibility). 
38 JOHN STUART MILL, 0:--.: LlBERTY 10-11, 208, 239-46 PASSJM (David Spitz ed., 
Norton 1975) (1859) (asserting the principle that only self-protection warrants society's 
control over the individual). 
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Liberal philosophers Joel Feinberg,39 Gerald Dworkin,40 and David A .J. 
Richards41 maintain that the moral basis for constitutional privacy rights is 
that they protect the formation and exercise of moral autonomy. 
Moral autonomy has not had an easy life in the hands of the law. As often 
as the law has empowered human beings by protecting their morally autono­
mous choices, it has subordinated, enslaved, and destroyed them .  The Gris­
wold case might have appeared to be the final legal liberation of moral 
autonomy in the United States. Griswold seemed to place a magic wand­
the fundamental right to privacy-in eager hands. The right to privacy was 
autonomy's magic wand, a deft restraint on public regulation of decisions 
about health, sex, and procreationY One of the first categories of oppressive 
law to go was a vestige of American racism and slavery:  state laws prohibit­
ing marriage between men and women of different races43 The ban on inter­
racial marriage fell under the privacy doctrine, despite strong sentiments, 
then and now, that miscegenation is unnatural and ungodly.44 
IMPOTENCE AND DEMISE 
When Roe was decided in 1973, the right to privacy must have seemed 
like a powerful tool indeed . U nder Roe, women have a privacy right that 
allows them to terminate their pregnancies . They have this right, notwith­
standing significant public disapproval .45 That, however, is the nature of a 
39 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 47-97 (1986) (exploring the limits imposed on 
personal autonomy by the rivalry between criminal law and individual moral autonomy). 
40 See generally GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 
(1988) (developing and applying a new concept of autonomy). 
41 See generally DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 231-
81 (1986) (advocating and applying an alternative integrated interpretive approach to 
constitutional privacy). 
42 Anita L. Allen, Court Disables Di�puted Legacy of Privacy Right, Nxr'L L.J., Aug. 
13, 1990, at S8 ("The Rehnquist Court is disabling a controversial jurisprudence of fun­
damental constitutional privacy that, for a time after [Griswold] and [Roe], promised to 
become autonomy's magic wand-a deft restraint on public regulation of decisions about 
public health."). 
•13 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (unanimou3 decision rendering unconstitu­
!ional statutes barring interracial marriages). 
4'1 David Margolick, A Mixed ;\1arriage's 25th Anniversary of Legaiity. N.Y. TJ>,tES. 
June 12. 1992. at B20 (relating that the sheriff who intruded into the Lovings· bedwom in 
i 958 and charged them with unlawful cohabitation still thinks the anti-miscegenation 
statute should exist and quoting him as saying: "'I don't think a white person should 
marry a black person. 
another.' "). 
The Lord made sparrows and robin s , not to rmx w:th one 
45 Of course, public support existed. too. See RHODE. supra note 22. at 203 (stating 
that in the decade before Roe, public approval of abortion for pregn;:mcies resulting from 
rare or incest. or in cases of fetal abnormalities or threat to the mother's health, reached 
as high as 80% to 90%). Hundreds of thousands of women were already h:1ving abnr­
llons each year before Roe. In 1967, estimates of the numher of abortions performt:d 
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magtc wand. One can use it as one wishes, in the independent exercise of 
one's own j udgment. 
After R oe,  some feared-and others hoped-that anything was possible, 
that Roe had generated momentum down a slippery slope. We must tolerate 
abortion . Consequently,  we must also tolerate obscenity and pornography, 
prostitution between consenting adults, marij uana smoking, and homosexual 
sodomy.  The right to privacy was a magic wand! If i t  w ere invoked, the 
courts would do one's bidding, ridiculous or sublime. "They" would declare 
long-haired minors immune from expulsion from public schools ;46 "they" 
would prevent doctors from forcibly sustaining the elderly and injured who 
persisted in a vegetative state in state hospitals, long after their meaningful 
lives had ended.47 
The right to privacy, however, has proven less powerful  than first appear­
ances suggested. The right to privacy-the principle of public toleration of 
autonomous, self-regarding choice-was never a magic wand.  The magic 
wand conception of the right to privacy was a mere illusion,  a fantasy whose 
practical l imitations became clear. Prostitution was never decriminalized on 
constitutional privacy grounds, even during the 1970's, when casual sex and 
"one-night stands" were commonplace and the risk of exposure to the AIDS 
virus did not poison every sexual encounter.48 In addition, homosexual sod­
omy remained unprotected by the Constitution . The Court,  arguing that 
the right to engage in homosexual acts was not fundamental, upheld a Geor­
gia criminal statute under which police arrested a homosexual after they 
entered his home and discovered him engaging in sodomy.49 Bowers 
ranged from as low as two hundred thousand to as high as two million. Harold Rosen, A 
Case Study in Social Hypocrisy. in ABORTION IN AMERIC\ 299, 299 (Harold Rosen eel., 
1967) (arguing for the right of women to have abortions and finding hypocrisy in medical 
and legal approaches to the issue). 
46 Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1974) (declaring unconstitutional that 
portion of a high school grooming code that related to boys' hair length). Bu1 see New 
Rider v. Board ofEduc., 480 F.2d 693 (lOth Cir. 1973) (holding that a junior high school 
rule prohibiting hair length beyond shirt collar did not violate Pawnee Indian students' 
guarantees of freedom of speech. free exercise of religion, equal protection. or due 
process). 
41 Cruzan v. Director. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S 261 (1990) (holding that a per­
son's liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing medical treatment may 
extend to life-sustaining treatment. but that a surrogate exercising this 1·ight for Jn incom­
petent person may be limited by the state's interest in protecting and preserving life): In 
re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (allowing father acting as comatose daughter's 
guardian to discontinue her life support provided her medical prognosis contained no 
chance of a cognitive recovery). 
�8 State v. Mueller, 671 P.2d 1351 (Haw. 1933) (holding that eng�!ging irr .;e;<. for hire 
with consenting adults in the privacy of the home is not a fundamental right rrotec:ted by 
the constitutional guarantees of privacy). 
49 Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) 
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strongly suggests that the right to privacy is narrow in application,  with the 
private sphere encompassing only traditional heterosexual family values. 
The impotence and demise of the Griswold privacy doctrine was even 
clearer in Cruzan, in which the state court had begun with the premise that 
the right to die was a fundamental one. I m plicitly eschewing fundamental 
rights analysis, the Supreme Court asked only whether Missouri violated 
Cruzan's Fourteenth Amendment "liberty interest" when the Missouri 
Supreme Court required that C ruzan's parents present "clear and convinc­
ing evidence'' of their daughter's wish to terminate life-sustaining artificial 
nutrition and hydration. The Court's analysis suggests that the right to pri­
vacy is weaker in the contexts to which it is deemed to apply-i . e . ,  it is a 
mere liberty interest, not a fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny.  
Dissenting opinions in leadin g  abortion cases have challenged both the 
right to privacy50 and the notion that abortion rights are among our privacy 
rights.51 Majority opinions in recent abortion cases now reflect the narrow­
ing and weakening of the privacy doctrine. In Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services, 52 the Court permitted legislation requiring viability testing 
and limits on publicly funded physician care, 53 and the opinion of the Chief 
Justice allowed states to assert an interest in the unborn at conception, an 
idea a majority of the Court now embraces. 54 In  two recent cases involving 
teen access to abortion, parental notification statutes containing a j udicial 
by-pass provision were upheld . 55 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens, an 
abortion "liberal," applied Justice O'Connor's weaker "undue burden" test 
to rationalize the Court's decision that the Constitution permits states to 
treat minors differently from adults with respect to abortion.  In R ust v. Sul­
livan, the Court used the line of cases upholding the right of government to 
refuse to fund indigent women's abortions to uphold the "gag rule," \vhich 
prevented physicians in federally funded clinics from discussing abortion 
w i th their low income patients. 56 Neither privacy nor free speech values pre­
vailed on behalf of the abortion right in R ust. Casey continues the p rocess of 
disregarding the free speech and private choice implications of state abortion 
50 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I have difficulty 
in concluding . .. that the right of 'privacy' is involved in this case . ... A transaction 
resulting in an operation such as this [i.e. , a medical abortion] is not 'private' in the.: 
ordinary usage of rhat word.''). 
51 See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 Li.S. 
747, 785-36 (1986) (White, L joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court carries 
forward the 'difficult and continuing venture in substantive due process' ... that bc.:gan 
with . . . Roe v. Wade . .. and has lead the Court further and further af1eld in the thirte:::n 
years since the decision was handed down."). 
52 492 U.S. 490 (1990). 
53 !d. 
5' See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816. 
55 Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Rep rod. Health, 497 U.S 502 ( 1990); Hodgson v. l'v1inne­
sota. 497 U.S 417 (1990). 
56 Rust v. Su:Jivan, IllS. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
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laws; although it invalidated spousal notification and upheld R oe, Casey also 
upheld informed consent provisions that dictated what physicians must say 
to their patients. 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECTIONS 
Directional metaphors are a useful device for distinguishing among differ­
ing approaches to legal interpretation and adj udication . J udges decide cases 
from perspectives that are to one degree or another backward-looking, for­
ward-looking, upward-looking, downward-looking, and/or inward-looking. 
In my view, an important explanation for the demise of the fundamental 
right to privacy doctrine and the resultant constriction of abortion liberty is 
the Court's increasing commitment to backward-looking legal positivism 
and downward-looking moral positivism as its interpretive philosophy of 
constitutional, including fundamental, rights. 
In  adopting backward-looking perspectives, j udges rely on established 
positive l aw,  including statutes, case precedents, constitutions, and interna­
tional treaties. In  deciding a case, the backward-looking approach searches 
for the original intent of the framers (originalism, intentionalism) or refer­
ences the plain meaning of the text (textualism). Judges with forward-look­
ing perspectives reference optimal social or economic policies.  A lthough the 
backward-looking j udge would choose between consequence A and conse­
quence B on the basis of e xisting positive legal norms, a forward-looking 
judge would feel unconstrained by established Jaw that furthers n o  beneficial 
interest. Among the traditional legal philosophies, positivism is the legal 
philosophy of the backward-looking j udge; realism is the philosophy of the 
forward-looking judge.57 
Upward-looking perspectives base decisions on their conformity to nor­
mative ideals. Upward-looking perspectives consider appeals to ideal moral­
ity, natural law, or some other rationally  or intuitively ascertainable norms. 
Like the forward-looking j ud ge, the upward looker bases decisions on sub­
stantive values not necessarily embodied in existing law.  However, the 
upward-looking judge may not hold strictly practical values. For example, 
the judge may view justice as a Kantian, adhering to categorical principles, 
would view it. Natural lawy.ers are upward lookers who believe that rules of 
reason are a substantive constraint on the law's legitimacy.58 
Upward-looking jurisprudence relies upon supposedl y  higher ideals. B:y 
contrast, downward-looking jurisprudence appeals to the wishes, opimons. 
57 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) (presenting what became an 
influential revival and critique of nineteenth century British positivism); Karl N. Llewel­
lyn, Some Realism About Rea/ism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REv 12:?.2 
( 1934) (detailing classic realist methods and positions). See generally Felix S. Cohen. 
Transcendenwl Nonsense and rhe Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L RE\i. 809 ( 1935) 
(describing a realist approach to jurisprudence). 
58 See gqnera/!y JOHN FtNNlS, NATURAL LAW .>.ND N.'\TCRAL RIGHTS (1980) (re·,i\­
ing rational "natural law·· philosophy). 
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and expectations of the community, whether or not they have been enacted 
into positive law or they satisfy higher normative principles or practical poli­
cies. The actual positive values of the community, or a majority within the 
community, are the basis of the downward looker's decisions. Downward 
lookers are to positive moral values what backward lookers are to positive 
legal values. 
Finally, inward-looking perspectives eschew any attempt to ground judg­
ment on a non-subjective or non-intersubj ective foundation. Inward-looking 
considerations appeal directly to subjectivity, to what the decisionmaker 
believes is best, whether or not it  conforms to popular will, ideal norms, 
practical policies, or "past political acts." The self-conscious inward looker 
may be a post-modernist who believes that the backward looker's j udgments 
about past political acts, the forward looker's social or economic optimums, 
the upward looker's higher values, and the downward looker's community 
values are veiled j udgments about socially constructed personal preferences. 
I believe the opinions of modern American j udges reflect all of the direc­
tional tendencies identified here. 59 Courts rarely completely ignore the for­
ward-looking benefits to be gained or the highest ideals of upward-looking 
j ustice. However, the Supreme Court has embraced backward-looking posi­
tivism as its official legal philosophy.  On the level of rhetoric, backward­
looking perspectives dominate the pronouncements of the Supreme Court. 
As lawyers know, even in this post-realist, post-modernist world, the perva­
sive rhetorical approaches of the Justices of the Court, whether liberal or 
conservative, reflect a tendency to j ustify interpretations and decisions by 
considering backward-looking appeals to intent, text, and precedent. A 
favorite ancillary rhetorical approach of the Court is positivistic traditional­
ism-the downward-looking appeal to the nation's or Western world's nor­
mative traditions. The positivism of Justices Scalia and Thomas, to choose 
the Court 's  most conservative members, goes beyond rhetoric to substance. 
Positivism is a way of doing as well as speaking. 
Based on the tenor of the Court's opinions, its conception of i ts interpre­
tive and decisional role is that of an institution bound to serve the public as 
an independent, apolitical branch of government charged with interpreting 
and applying in a principled manner laws it  did not author. The legislative 
and constitutional will of the sovereign people dictates the substance of j udi­
cial decisionmaking-this is the assurance offered by liberal and conservative 
Justices alike. 
Fortunately, American law and ethical traditions appear to embody many 
good values, sensible policies, and ideals of justice. For this reason, positiv­
ism in constitutional adjudication is not wholly condemnable in practice. 
The virtual unity of law and justice renders legal and moral posi tivism's 
backward- and downward-looking directions palatable . However, the 
Court's  resort to backward-looking and downward-looking adjudication 
59 Richard Posner agrees. See RIC H A R D  A. PosN E R ,  THE P R O B L E'\IS or J U R ISPRU­
D E N C E  ( 1 990) (defending a pragmatic,  ins trumental conception of l a w  a n d  adj udicat i o n ) .  
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ceases to be palatable in  two problematic situations :  when it  seems phony 
and when it seems unjust.  
Judicial positivism seems phony when the result reached in  a case does not 
appear to be premised on the positive values stated, so that the Court's  rhet­
oric of positivism appears unpersuasive. Judicial positivism seems unj ust 
when,  although it  may succeed as positivistic rhetoric, the resu l t  reached in  a 
case seems to violate important extra-legal or non-traditional norms. 
Al though realist and critical legal studies opponents of positivism oppose it 
as a comprehensive legal philosophy because it  seems phony, the proponents 
of traditional natural law rej ect positivism because it seems u nj ust .  Phony 
positivism, critics say, conceals the multiplicity of factors involved in decid­
ing a case; unj ust positivism, n aturalists say, impedes relief for victims of 
wrongdoing and progress for victims of oppression and discrimination. 
I join other constitutional scholars who detect pernicious forms of positiv­
ism in many areas of Supreme Court j urisprudence. 5° B oth liberal and con­
servative j udges tend to issue opinions that are positivist . In Bowers, for 
example, the liberal dissenters relied on two positivistic sources of law: the 
text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the precedent of previous right of 
p rivacy cases. 51 Frank Michelman argues that the Bowers m ajority likewise 
" ·Nears its positivistic constitutional theory on its sleeve.  ' '62 Putting aside 
the re levance of j udgments about whether laws against sodomy between con­
senting adults are "wise or desirable ,"  Justice White framed the issue in 
Bowers as "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right 
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. "63 He then looked to the very kind 
of bigoted state laws against homosexuality as those under review for norma­
t ive guidance on whether the Fourteenth Amendmen t ought to protect con­
senting adult homosexuals. 
\Vhy is the right to privacy unpopular with the current Court? Some 
un popularity may have to do with the kinds of controversial behavior-such 
as homosexuality and abortion-that are protected under the right of p ri­
vacy rubric .  Judicial critics publicly oppose the doctrine on other grounds, 
chiefly the bacbvard-looking positivist ground that the right to p rivacy is 
not a textually based or enumerated right, but an undemocratic invemion. 
Justice Scalia, for example, attacked the abortion pnvacy doctrine in his 
60 Silas .J . Wasserstrom & Louis M. Seid man , The Fo unh A m endmcn r os Consritu­
rionai Th eory , 77 G EO. L . J .  1 9. 67-68 ( 1 9 8 8) ( ' 'Si nce the demise of Lochner v. Ne\v 
York[,  1 9 8  U . S .  45 ( 1 905),]  and the discredi t i ng of the natural  law ideology that  S ilp­
po rted it,  positivism has played a dominant role i n  certain corners o f  cons t i tu t ional t he­
ory [i ncludmg chal lenges t o  social and economic legis lat ion on equal protec t i o n  grounds .  
judicial enforcement of due process, and the contracts and takings clausesl " ) .  
6 1  Bo wers, 4 7 8  U . S .  a t  1 99-2 1 4  ( Blackm u n ,  J . ,  joi ned bv Brennan. Mars h al l .  & S kvens. 
JL dissen t ing). 
62 Frank M ichelman. La w 's R epu b!ic , 97 Y A L E  LJ. 1 49 3 .  1 497 ( 1 9 88 ) .  
6 3  Bowers. 478 U . S .  a t  1 90. 
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Casey dissent because of what he called "two simple facts."64 They were 
that "( 1 )  the Constitution says absolutely nothing about [abortion] , and (2) 
the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted [abortion] to 
be legally proscribed. "65 Similarly, scholarly critics maintain that the fram­
ers did not enumerate a right to privacy for a good reason: it is too broad 
and vague to function as a constitutional principle. Moreover, by virtue of 
its breadth and vagueness, the right to privacy grants the federal judiciary 
powers that approach those of the legislature, which powers properly belong 
to Congress and state lawmakers. 
Justice Scalia adheres to what Professor Mark Tushnet labels "in terpretiv­
ism. "66 Interpretivism holds that judges should l imit themselves to norms 
that are stated or clearly implied in the written Constitution and to the fram­
ers' normative intent. According to Tushnet, textualism, intentionalism, 
originalism, and other forms of interpretivism have popular appeal . They 
appeal to many who believe that they respond to the problem "that j udges 
no less than legislators were political actors, motivated primari ly by their 
own interests and values. "67 Tush net contrasts interpretivism with another 
liberal ideology of which he is equally critical :  "neutral principles . "  Neutral 
principles maintains that j udicial process must be based on general i mpartial 
neutral principles. Although textualist interpretivists view the written docu­
ment as a non-arbitrary foundation for legal reasoning, neutral principles 
theorists view their own rationally derived principles as foundations. 
Casey pitted Justice Scalia's interpretivism against the model of neutral 
principles followed by Justices O ' Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. Justice 
Scalia's "two simple facts"68 reflect his positivistic interpretivism . The mod­
erate Justices' joint opinion is a paradigm of neutral principalism, upward­
looking to right reason, but j ustified by appeal to the backward-looking 
norm of legal tradition: 
The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process 
c laims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exer­
cise the same capacity which courts have always exercised:  reasoned 
j udgment. Its boundaries are not susceptible of expression in a simple 
rule. That does not mean we are free to invalidate state policy choices 
with which we disagree; yet neither does it permit us to shrink from the 
duties of our office. 69 
04 Casey, 1 1 2 S. Ct. at 2874. 
55 !d. 
66 Mark V. Tushnet, Following the R u les Laid Down: A Critique of Interprelivism and 
.Yeu 1ral Principles, 96 H A R V .  L .  REV. 78 1 ( 1 983) (deta i l ing and cri t iquing interpret i v i srn 
and neu t ral principles, t wo leading theories of modern const i tu t ional Jaw tha t attempt  to 
l imit j udicial discretion). 
6' !d . at 784. 
GS Sec supra text accompanying note 64. 
69 Casey , 1 1 2 S. Ct .  at 2 806. 
696 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol .  72 :683 
. T h e  Court must take care t o  speak and act in way s  that allow 
people to accept its decision on the terms the Court claims for them, as 
grounded truly in principle . . . .  70 
I would criticize the Court for attempting to elevate reason to a level of 
obj ectivity and neutrality beyond its fallibly human scale, but praise it for 
refusing to limit constitutional interpretation to text and tradition.  Yet, the 
majority in Casey engaged in  a good deal of backward-looking argumenta­
tion, insisting on stare decisis on behalf of Roe and reaffirming Roe by 
appealing to the cases that support it .  The majority opinion, which appears 
to be an attempt to strike a workable compromise between the political 
extremes of the pro-choice and pro-life positions, is weak in its downward 
focused re-reading of Roe. 
The Casey majority does not directly address the familiar arguments for 
narrowly limiting interpretation to text and tradition. Briefly, the arguments 
in  favor of interpretivism are that it is democratic, objective, and safe, and it 
is a t  least safer for oppressed minorities than the alternative of u nrestrained 
j udicial law-making. Counter-arguments include ( 1 )  that originalism must 
be rejected because it mandates doing injustice if the law is unjust;  (2) that 
interpretivism is impossible, and therefore il lusory or phony;71 (3) that 
attempts to discover what the framers intended will lead to ambiguous and 
indeterminate results; (4) that our efforts to look backward are l imited by 
our own normative horizons; and (5) that originalism ' s  majori tarian and 
democratic pretensions are just that: pretensions. 
I view philosophical arguments against interpretivism as more compelling 
than the arguments for it .  Unjust old law and its interpretation should 
not-and cannot-govern new times. Neither backward-looking originalism 
and textualism nor downward-looking traditionalism can survive the obser­
vation that dramatic changes have occurred since the Constitution was 
enacted . The Constitution is an imperfect eighteenth century document. It 
i s  imperfect because the notorious Three-fifths Compromise marred it .  
Niore generally, it is imperfect because i t  has failed to protect ful ly  African 
Americans, Native Americans, white women, and poor people. Even after 
the addition of the Bill of Rights, the Constitution remained imperfect. It 
took the post-Civil War Amendments to deconstitutionalize involuntary ser­
vitude, the disenfranchisement of women, and the poll tax. 
I can offer no full-fledged alternative to interpretivism i n  the p lace of 
backward-looking and downward-looking positivism. One has to be wil l ing 
to cal l  a rotten egg rotten, however, even if  there is nothing else to eat .  For­
tunately ,  there is a bit of bread in the cupboard once textualism and original­
ism are rejected. I believe that, at a minimum, courts should seek to bring 
about their own substantive j ustice, unfettered, if  the occasion demands, by 
failed efforts of previous generations to do t h e  same. The great practical 
70 !d. a t  2814. 
71 See supra text  accompan ying notes 59-60. 
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value of the American Constitution is that its  inspirational general language 
allows, invites, and requires hard judicial thinking about the ideal terms and 
conditions of social and economic life. 
Legal theorists often debate whether courts should limit their vision to 
established law and tradition.  Theorists, however, seldom voice a related 
and equally important concern: prospective positivism. The problem of pro­
spective positivism exists because human beings "make" as well as " inter­
pret" law, and because the reasonability of positivist expectations at the 
moment of legislation is as questionable as the reasonability of these expecta­
tions at the moment of adjudication. Can legislators reasonably expect 
future generations to yield to their expressions of legislative will? The case 
for interpretivism is weakened to the extent that one cannot reasonably 
expect one's wil l  to be done indefinitely into the future. The concern I am 
raising can be illuminated by an analogy. 
The famous British utilitarian legal philosopher Jeremy Bentham wanted 
to retain influence over his fol lowers after his death. At his request when he 
died, his remains were dissected and preserved. Dressed in his clothes and 
seated in a chair, his preserved body was placed in a glass display case as an 
auto-icon.72 When Bentham's actual head became unattractively desiccated ,  
i t  was removed, placed a t  his feet, a n d  replaced with a w a x  l ikeness. 
Bentham thought physical preservation would ensure the longevity of his 
philosophic influence more effectively than his many books and articles. 
Yet, i t  is unlikely that the utilitarian sect or the board of the University of 
London was especially faithful to Bentham's wishes. The expectation of one 
generation that its law will  continue to have the same meaning for the next 
generation is as vain as Bentham's pathetic expectation. For law to stick, it 
must appear to conform to the perceived interests and values of succeeding 
generations. 
The American Constitution is durable precisely because it  meets 
the appearance-of-conformity requirement.  Constitutional i nterpretations 
change because of the rhetorical and practical failures of judges to predict 
future wants and values. It was more important to Bentham's survivors to 
have an attractive head on his auto-icon, than Bentham's actual head. It 
may be more important to the American people to have a Fourteenth 
Amendment that protects women as equals, than to have an Amendment 
that conforms to authentic nineteenth century expecrations. 
CONCL USION 
Abo rtion j urisprudence demonstrates that, in  practice, const i tu t ional 
i nterpretation is neither especially precise nor especially binding.  Stare deci-
72 See Ross H ARRISON, BENTHAM 22-23 (19 8 3 )  (describing how ideas about  · · use of 
lhe  dead to the l iving" and ' "representation" created Bentham's  des i re to be d i ssected and 
turned in to an icon-relic for his eponymous u t i l i t arian sect ) .  Notably ,  Ben tham's  a u t o­
ICOn was produced at gatherings of Benthamites for 150 years. !d. 
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sis is not an "inexorable"73 principle. Egregious judicial errors m ust be cor­
rected; outdated, unworkable policies replaced; and s ubstantive inj ustice 
cured. To put it so starkly is  to suggest a kind of instability in Supreme 
Court practice. Yet, overall ,  the practice of the Court does not seem unsta­
ble. This may be because changes in given interpretations of text typically 
fol low changes in social l ife that mandate new doctrine.  The Supreme Court 
survived Casey because it offered something to those who favor women's 
rights and to those who favor fetal protection.  The next doctrinal shift may 
be the overturning of R oe .  However, the popular support for such a dra­
matic departure from existing law is  doubtful, and therefore the public reac­
tion to it is potentially explosive. 
------·----------------- ----- ---
73 C:sey . 1 1 2 S .  C t .  at 2808. 
